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PARTICIPANT AND BENEFICIARY REMEDIES UNDER
ERISA: EXTRACONTRACTUAL AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AFTER MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL
LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. RUSSELL
INTRODUCTION
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, I the Supreme
Court held that a participant in an employee benefit plan governed
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2
could not state a claim for extracontractual or punitive damages
under section 409 of the statute.3 By limiting its holding to section
409, the Court failed to provide lower courts with any useful gui-
dance to evaluate claims for such damages under other sections of
ERISA. Thus the question whether an individual participant can
ever recover extracontractual or punitive damages under ERISA re-
mains open.
This Note outlines in Section I the portions of ERISA that apply
to participants' rights of action. Section II discusses the Massachu-
setts Mutual decision. Section III evaluates the scope of the decision,
concludes that the narrowness of the Court's holding limits the deci-
sion's impact on ERISA claims, and explores the relief available to
ERISA claimants following the decision. Next, section IV studies
ERISA's legislative history, applicable trust law concepts, and the
language of the statute, arguing that ERISA supports extracontrac-
tual, but not punitive damages. Finally, section V proposes a frame-
work for resolving damage claims under ERISA and analyzes the
Massachusetts Mutual case using this framework.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Participants' Civil Enforcement Actions Under ERISA
1. Relieffor the Plan
ERISA allows plan participants to bring an action to recover
damages and receive equitable relief on behalf of the plan. The cre-
ation of this private cause of action reflects Congress's desire to pro-
tect plan participants4 and helps to reduce the Secretary of Labor's
1 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985) (Massachusetts Mutual).
2 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 and in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. (1982)).
3 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 7.
4 "It is... declared to be the policy of this [Act] to protect.., the interests of
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burden to enforce ERISA's substantive standards. 5 Two ERISA sec-
tions permit private actions on behalf of the plan. First, section
502(a)(2) provides:
A civil action may be brought -
(2) ... by a participant ... for appropriate relief under sec-
tion 1109 of this tite[.]6
Second, section 409(a) provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties im-
posed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally lia-
ble to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the
plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable
or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including
removal of such fiduciary. 7
A participant may bring an action under these provisions to recover
"appropriate relief" for the plan against a fiduciary's breach of his
duty.
2. Participant Relief
When a fiduciary violates his duty, harming a participant, the
participant may also bring a civil action on her own behalf. Two
sections of the Act provide for this type of relief. First, under sec-
tion 502(a)(1)(B), 8 a plaintiff may sue both a fiduciary and the plan9
participants in private pension plans ... by improving the... soundness of such plans
.... 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1982).
5 The Act imposes an obligation on the Secretary of Labor to police employee
benefit plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (1982). Considering the immense number of such
plans and their prominence in the national economy, this presents the Secretary with a
formidable task. See infra note 98.
6 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1982).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
8 Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides:
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant... -
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,
or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan[.]
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1982).
9 The Act does not detail the potential defendants that a plan participant may sue;
the question remains open. In oral argument plaintiff Russell argued that a fiduciary
cannot be sued under this section and that any relief awarded should come from the
plan itself. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. 3085
(1985). When pressed by the Court, Massachusetts Mutual, the defendant employer and
plan fiduciary, conceded that a fiduciary could be liable under this section as well. See id.
at 45. Although § 409 is the only remedial provision explicitly stating that a fiduciary
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to recover benefits due, enforce plan rights, and clarify future
benefits.
Second, utilizing section 502(a)(3), a plan participant may sue
for two types of equitable relief. l0 Subsection A allows a partici-
pant to enjoin actions that violate ERISA. Subsection B provides for
a broader form of equitable relief to redress violations or enforce
the Act or the plan. Given that Congress directed courts to grant
"appropriate equitable relief,"1 ' courts seemingly possess great dis-
cretion in fashioning remedies that they deem "appropriate" in a
particular situation.
B. Damages Under ERISA
1. Types of Damages
This Note refers to two types of damages: compensatory and
punitive. In addition, compensatory damages are of two sorts: gen-
eral and extracontractual. 12 Before examining what damages are
available under ERISA, it is helpful to outline these various forms of
relief.
Compensatory damages "compensate the injured party for the
injury sustained, and nothing more.' 3 These damages serve to
"make good or replace the loss caused by the... injury."' 14 General
damages are "the natural, necessary, and usual result" of the
wrong. 15 In the context of an ERISA claim, "general damages"
will be liable for any damages awarded under its terms, courts have also read another
ERISA section, § 502(a)(3), see infra note 10, as providing for fiduciary liability. See, e.g.,
Kann v. Keystone Resources, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1084 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (company and
individual trustees may be liable under § 502(a)(3) for refusal to pay accrued benefits);
Jiminez v. Pioneer Diecasters, 549 F. Supp. 677 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (ERISA action allowed
against individual fiduciaries for breach of exclusive benefit duty).
10 A civil action may be brought -
(3) by a participant... (A) to enjoin any act or practice which vio-
lates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan[.]
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
11 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1982). See also infra note 100.
12 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BLACK'S]. Most
sources suggest that compensatory damages are comprised of both general and special
damages. Because the Massachusetts Mutual Court chose to use the term "extracontrac-
tual" instead of "special," this Note adopts the Court's language.
ERISA itself does not describe damages as punitive, compensatory, general, or ex-
tracontractual. See supra notes 6-8, 10 and accompanying text. These terms will, how-
ever, be useful in discussing the Court's opinion and in studying the damages available
under the Act.
13 BLAcK's, supra note 12, at 352.
14 Id.
15 Id. See also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 138 (1973) ("General
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might include the benefits that a fiduciary wrongfully denied a
participant.
Extracontractual damages "are the actual, but not the neces-
sary, result of the injury complained of."' 6 They arise from "some
of the consequences or results of such act."' 7 A claim for mental
distress caused by a fiduciary's breach falls within this category.
Monetary loss above and beyond the contractual terms is also a
source of extracontractual damages.
Distinguishing between general and extracontractual damages
can be troublesome. Both are "proximately caused" by the fiduci-
ary's breach.' 8 The cause of the extracontractual compensatory
component of a damages award is slightly more remote, however,
than the cause of a general compensatory award.' 9
Punitive damages are those "given to the plaintiff over and
above the full compensation for [her] injuries. '20 These damages
serve three purposes: punishing the defendant, deterring the de-
fendant from repeating the injurious act, and deterring others from
following the defendant's example. 21
2. Expressly Provided Damage Relief
Although ERISA does not specify the types of damages avail-
able for a violation, the express causes of action for a benefit plan
participant include provisions for damage relief. Damages are gen-
erally assessed in monetary terms.22  For instance, under
502 (a) (1) (B), a participant may recover an amount equal to the ben-
damages.., are damages that courts believe 'generally' flow from the kind of substan-
tive wrong done by the defendant.").
16 BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 354. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 138 ("Special
damages [extracontractual damages] include items of loss that are more or less peculiar
to the particular plaintiff and would not be expected to occur regularly to other plaintiffs
in similar circumstances.").
17 BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 352.
18 D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 138. "Courts traditionally attack the problem of as-
sessing damages in a two-step process. In the first step they lay down and apply a rule of
general damages. In the second step they add in 'special' or 'consequential' damages
[extracontractual damages] if such damages are adequately proved and not considered
too remote." Id.
19 First, "special damages must be proved to a reasonable certainty.... [Second,]
no special damages are recoverable if they are deemed remote. In tort cases this may be
expressed in terms of proximate cause." Id. at 139 (footnote omitted).
20 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (5th ed.
1984).
21 Id. Professors Prosser and Keeton add that another purpose of punitive damages
occasionally cited by the courts is to reimburse "the plaintiff for elements of damage
which are not legally compensable, such as wounded feelings or the expenses of suit."
Id.
22 "The damages award is substitutionary relief, that is, it gives the plaintiff money
... to make up for some loss." D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 135.
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efits due her.23
Although other ERISA sections do not explicitly mention dam-
ages, some sections obliquely provide for them. Under section
502(a)(3), for example, a participant may obtain "appropriate equi-
table relief" that will provide "redress" for violations of the Fiduci-
ary Responsibility subchapter.24 Equitable relief commonly includes
injunctions, specific performance, and restitution.25 However, in
certain situations, equitable relief may also include monetary dam-
ages. 26 Similarly, sections 502(a)(2) and 409(a) may authorize
money damages in appropriate circumstances.2 7
II
THE MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL CASE
A. The District Court's Decision 28
Doris Russell, a claims examiner for Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Company, was a beneficiary under the company's em-
ployee benefit plans governed by ERISA. In May of 1979, Russell
became disabled with a back ailment. She received benefits until
October, when the company's disability committee terminated her
payments based on an orthopedic surgeon's report. Later that
month, Russell requested internal review of the termination and in
November, she submitted a report from her own psychiatrist stating
that the ailment was a psychosomatic disability with physical mani-
festations rather than an orthopedic illness. 29 Although the plan
provided disability benefits for psychosomatic illnesses, the plan fi-
duciaries required that Russell undergo another psychiatric evalua-
tion with a company-selected psychiatrist. The second psychiatrist
confirmed that Russell was temporarily disabled. On March 11,
1980, the plan administrators reinstated Russell's benefit payments
and fully paid her retroactive benefits.
Russell sued Massachusetts Mutual in California Superior
Court, claiming numerous violations of state law.30 She alleged that
23 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
24 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
25 BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 484.
26 See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 862, at 27-29
(rev. 2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as G. BOGERT]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 199, 205 (1959).
27 See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
28 The district court's decision was unreported. See Appendix to Petition for
Certiorari, Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., CV-81-116-R (1984)
(microfiche).
29 Russell had a past history of psychosomatic illnesses. In 1967 and 1977, she took
leaves of absence because of these maladies. Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
722 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983) (Russell).
30 Id. at 484. More specifically, Russell asserted various state-law claims including
[Vol. 71:10141018
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during the 132 days that she was denied her plan benefits, the re-
sulting financial difficulties forced her disabled husband to cash out
his retirement savings. She further claimed that the delay aggra-
vated the psychological condition that caused her back ailment.31
Massachusetts Mutual removed the case to federal court.3 2
In federal district court, Russell argued that the disability com-
mittee's termination of her benefits, based solely on the orthopedic
surgeon's report, violated her rights to competent and timely claims
administration under ERISA.3 3 She requested extracontractual and
punitive damages. 34 The court granted summary judgment in favor
of Massachusetts Mutual holding that, as a matter of law, neither
extracontractual nor punitive damages are available under ERISA in
connection with a review of a benefit termination.3 5
B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision
The Ninth Circuit partly reversed the district court, holding
that ERISA authorizes recovery of both extracontractual and puni-
tive damages for a fiduciary's breach of duty.36 The court reasoned
that section 502(a)(2)37 provides a beneficiary with a cause of action
through section 409(a)38 for the breach of the fiduciary's duty to
provide competent and timely claims administration. 9 According to
the court, section 409(a) contains the critical language supporting
an award of extracontractual damages.40 This section expressly au-
thorizes a court to award "equitable or remedial relief it deems ap-
propriate" against an errant fiduciary. The court found additional
support for its holding in ERISA's legislative history,4 ' arguing fur-
ther that allowing such relief encourages fiduciaries to abide by the
breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. All were based on the initial suspension
of her benefits.
31 Id. at 486-87.
32 Id. at 484. Massachusetts Mutual removed the action to district court on the
grounds that ERISA governed Russell's claim.
33 Russell amended her complaint to allege that the fiduciary actions also violated
ERISA. The district court held that ERISA preempted Russell's state-law claims and
accordingly dismissed them. Russell unsuccessfully appealed the dismissal to the court
of appeals. Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3088.
34 Russell, 722 F.2d at 485.
35 "Federal law developed under ERISA bars any claims for extra-contractual dam-
ages and punitive damages arising out of the original denial of plaintiff's claims for ben-
efits ... and the subsequent review thereof." Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at 29a,
Russell v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., CV-81-116-R (1984) (microfiche).
36 Russell, 722 F.2d at 485-86.
37 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
39 Russell, 722 F.2d at 488.
40 Id. at 490.
41 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974
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Act.4 2
The court relied on similar reasoning to support the availability
of punitive damages. It pointed to House and Senate committee
reports, which stated that the Act would provide "the full range of
legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal
courts." 43 The court stressed that courts should only grant punitive
awards in situations where the fiduciary "acted with actual malice or
wanton indifference to the rights of a participant or beneficiary." 44
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
In a unanimous decision with four Justices concurring, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.45 Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens first parsed ERISA's statutory text for explicit au-
thority for the requested damage award. 46 The Court, noting that
Russell relied exclusively on section 409(a) of ERISA, analyzed her
claim under that section. 47 The Court agreed with Massachusetts
Mutual and found that section 409 authorizes recovery only by the
pension plan and not by an individual participant.48 The Court
pointed out that section 409 refers to the fiduciary relationship as
one "with respect to a plan,"' 49 noting that the section required the
fiduciary "to make good to such plan any losses to the plan... and to
restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been
made through use of assets of the plan."50 The Court concluded that
the section, viewed as a whole, indicated that the concluding phrase,
"such other equitable or remedial relief," refers to "plan-related"
relief only.51 Consequently, the statute did not explicitly authorize
Russell's individual claim for extracontractual and punitive
damages.52
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4655; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4871).
42 Russell, 722 F.2d at 490.
43 Id. at 491 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., lstSess. 17 (1973), reprintedin
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 4639,4655; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 35
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4871).
44 Russell, 722 F.2d at 492.
45 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985).
46 Id. at 3089-92.
47 Id. at 3089. In a footnote, Justice Stevens commented, "Because respondent re-
lies entirely on § 409(a), and expressly disclaims reliance on § 502(a)(3), we have no
occasion to consider whether any other provision of ERISA authorizes recovery of extra-
contractual damages." Id. at 3089 n.5. Russell relied solely on § 409 because she did
not think that a fiduciary could be a defendant under 502(a)(3). See supra note 9.
48 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3090.
49 Id. at 3089.
50 Id. at 3090 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982)) (emphasis added by Court).
51 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3090.
52 Because the Court found that Russell could not state a claim on her own behalf
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The Court then considered 5 whether such a right of action
should be implied under the guidelines set forth in Cort v. Ash. 54 In
that case, the Supreme Court established a four-pronged test for
courts to apply when deciding whether to imply a private right of
action if one is not expressly provided by the statute. The test re-
quires that a court ask:
1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted?
2) Is there any indication of legislative intent-explicit or im-
plicit-to create or to deny such a remedy?
3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme to imply such a remedy?
4) Is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law?55
Massachusetts Mutual contended that a claim under section
409(a) failed under the second prong of the Cort v. Ash test because
ERISA's legislative history did not evince congressional intent to
provide extracontractual damages. Justice Stevens argued that the
Ninth Circuit's reliance on the legislative history's reference to "the
full range of legal and equitable relief" 56 was misplaced because the
phrase referred to a version of section 409(a) which Congress later
changed. 57 Justice Stevens also found that Russell's claim did not
satisfy the third prong of the Cort v. Ash test. He noted that the stat-
utory scheme was "carefully-integrated" and that the Court should
not "fine-tune" such an enforcement mechanism. 58 The Court con-
cluded that Russell was not entitled to any additional damages for
the plan administrators' refusal to pay benefits.
In dicta, the Court indicated that ERISA's fiduciary duty provi-
sions did not even apply to a claim for misadministration or un-
timely processing of a benefit claim. The Court surveyed the
principal statutory duties imposed on ERISA fiduciaries and con-
cluded that these duties apply primarily to the management and ad-
ministration of the plan assets, 59 as opposed to administration of
benefit claims. The Court noted that the statutory section involving
"Administration and Enforcement" is located in a completely sepa-
under § 409, it did not reach the question of whether a plan participant has right to
proper claim administration.
53 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3092-93.
54 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
55 Id. at 78. In Cort v. Ash, the plaintiff sought to imply a civil action from a criminal
statute. The Court indicated that it would be more willing to imply a civil action from
civil statute. See id. at 78-80.
56 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
57 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3093.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 3091.
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rate part of ERISA than the "Fiduciary Responsibility" section, 60
suggesting that the responsibilities the Act imposes on fiduciaries
may not apply to claims administration.
In further dicta, the Court cursorily examined the Secretary of
Labor's regulations concerning claims review.61 The Court found
that the regulations, which set time limits for fiduciary review of a
participant's claim, do not provide for a participant's recovery from
either the plan or its fiduciaries if a claim exceeds the prescribed
time limit.62 Justice Stevens concluded that Congress did not intend
to provide an action for untimely processing of a benefit claim.
The Court mentioned one further consideration in determining
that a plan participant could not seek extracontractual damages.
The Court noted that "the statutory provision explicitly authorizing
a beneficiary to bring an action to enforce his rights under the
plan-§ 502 (a) (1)(B) .. . -says nothing about the recovery of extra-
contractual damages, or about the possible consequences of delay in
the plan administrators' processing of a disputed claim." 63
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Black-
mun, concurred in the Court's judgment. Justice Brennan agreed
that section 409(a) authorized relief only for the plan and not for an
individual participant. 64 He emphasized, however, that the Court's
denial of damages applied strictly to section 409(a). He further
stressed that he did not subscribe to the Court's dicta that under-
mined the availability of extracontractual and punitive damages
under the other enforcement provisions of ERISA.65
Justice Brennan asserted that "some of the Court's remarks are
simply incompatible with the structure, legislative history, and pur-
poses of ERISA." 66 He "could not more strongly disagree" 67 with
the Court's remarks that the separation of the "Administration and
Enforcement" and "Fiduciary Responsibility" sections implied that
plan administrators' fiduciary duties run only to the plan itself and
not to its participants. In his view, Congress's intent to incorporate
trust law into ERISA68 and its explicit adoption of the "exclusive
60 Id.
61 Id. The Secretary's regulations can be found at 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1985).
62 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3091. The regulations provide that a claim is deemed
denied if a fiduciary does not issue a decision within the prescribed time limits. 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(4) (1985). If a participant wants to contest this "decision," the
regulations permit her to bring suit. Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3091.
63 Id. at 3091.
64 Id. at 3094-95.
65 Id. at 3095.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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benefit" rule69 require strict fiduciary care in claims administration
as well as in administration and management of the trust corpus.
The concurrence emphasized that Russell's sole reliance on
section 409(a) left open the possibility of recovery under other ER-
ISA sections.70 Justice Brennan specifically referred to section
502(a) (3), which authorizes the award of "appropriate equitable re-
lief" for a participant whose rights under subchapter 171 have been
violated.72 He noted that the fiduciary standards and the enforce-
ment provisions meant to protect beneficiary's rights both appear in
subchapter I.7 3 Thus, if a fiduciary fails to administer competently a
benefit claim, this section should provide the wronged participant
with relief.
Justice Brennan also objected to the Court's approach to judi-
cial construction of ERISA, 74 criticizing as unwarranted the court's
reluctance to "fine tune" ERISA's remedial scheme. 75 Instead, Jus-
tice Brennan contended that Congress explicitly directed courts to
apply trust law concepts and develop a federal common law that
provides "appropriate equitable relief" for violations of the Act.76
With this congressional purpose in mind, the concurrence con-
cluded by presenting its own general approach to the construction
of ERISA when considering damage claims. First, courts should
look to trust and pension law as developed by state courts to ascer-
tain the extent that damages beyond the withheld benefits would be
available. If state law furnishes this remedy, courts should then de-
termine whether such relief would conflict with ERISA's overall
scheme. Finally, courts should consider whether such relief furthers
the underlying purposes of ERISA. 77
III
THE IMPACT OF MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL
A. The Narrow Holding: Section 409
The Court's actual holding applies only to the denial of ex-
tracontractual and punitive relief to individual participants under
section 409.78 In this narrow form, the Court's holding is appropri-
69 See infra note 134.
70 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3095.
71 Subchapter I is entitled, "Protection of Employee Benefit Rights." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1982).
72 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3096. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
73 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3095-96.
74 Id. at 3097.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 3097-98.
77 Id. at 3098-99.
78 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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ate. The language of section 409(a)-which repeatedly refers to re-
covery by the plan-strongly supports the Court's reading that
courts should grant the section's relief only to a plan and not to an
individual participant.
The Court also considered the possibility of an implied right of
action in reaching its result. The Court's Cort v. Ash analysis also
strictly applies to section 409. The Massachusetts Mutual Court stated
that it could imply no right of action under section 409 allowing a
participant to sue for personal relief in the form of extracontractual
or punitive damages. The Cort v. Ash analysis, however, is misplaced
when applied to the Massachusetts Mutual case. The Cort v. Ash test
explores whether an implied cause of action exists when a statute
does not expressly provide for one.79 In Cort v. Ash, the Court
sought to determine whether a plaintiff could receive civil damages
based on the authority of a criminal statute. In contrast, the text of
section 409 clearly provides a private right of action. Thus, the real
issue in Massachusetts Mutual was whether a private plaintiff could
bring this action to recover damages on her own behalf, rather than
on behalf of the plan. Asking who receives damages and asking
whether a cause of action for damages exists at all are fundamentally
different questions.8 0 Furthermore, the Cort v. Ash test provides no
guidance for determining the scope of a damage award: it merely
focuses on whether Congress intended to permit a private right of
action at all. 8 ' Whether these damages are compensatory, extracon-
tractual, or punitive involves an entirely separate inquiry, one not
addressed by the Cort v. Ash analysis.
B. The Dangerous Dicta
Given the narrowness of the Court's holding in Massachusetts
Mutual, much of its opinion is dicta. Yet the apparent breadth of
this decision is troubling. Although the Court's holding only ap-
plies to section 409, its general remarks concerning ERISA suggest
that it will be reluctant to award extracontractual or punitive dam-
ages under other sections of the statute. Lower courts, however,
should not follow this language because the Court's supporting rea-
soning does not extend to ERISA's other remedial provisions.
79 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 68.
80 See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 55 n.4 (1977) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("This case.., does not present the same kind of issue discussed in Cort v. Ash,
. . . namely, whether the statute created an implied private remedy. Rather, the question
presented here is who may invoke that remedy.") (citation omitted).
81 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979) ("evi-
dence of intent.., weighs against the implication of a private right of action"); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ("our task is limited solely to deter-
mining whether Congress intended to create [a] private right of action").
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The Court's formulation of the question presented was too ex-
pansive, reflecting its failure to recognize the narrowness of its pre-
cise holding. The majority cast the issue as follows:
The question presented for decision is whether, under ... (ER-
ISA), a fiduciary to an employee benefit plan may be held person-
ally liable to a plan participant or beneficiary for extra-contractual
compensatory or punitive damages caused by improper or un-
timely processing of benefit claims.8 2
This formulation suggests that the Court's decision construes ER-
ISA as a whole, not just section 409(a). Lower courts should recog-
nize that the opinion does not represent a blanket prohibition of
extracontractual and punitive damages under ERISA.
The Court's analysis of other remedial sections of ERISA was
wholly inadequate. For instance, the Court commented that section
502 does not mention extracontractual and punitive damages, im-
plying that the section does not provide for such damages.8 3 This
discussion was irrelevant to the issue before the Court: namely,
whether section 409(a) provides for such relief. The possibility that
section 502 may well allow a claim for extracontractual and punitive
damages even though it makes no mention of such awards under-
scores the significance of the Court's failure to fully analyze that
section.8 4
The Court's presentation of ERISA's legislative history simi-
larly invites misinterpretation. The majority noted a "stark absence
... in [ERISA's] legislative history.., of any reference to an inten-
tion to authorize the recovery of extra-contractual damages."8 5
This statement reaches far beyond the confines of section 409 to
reach other relief-producing sections of the Act. Moreover, this
statement is arguably erroneous.8 6 Although the legislative history
does not explicitly refer to extracontractual damages, it may implic-
itly support such a damage claim.8 7 Congress intended that courts
look to the common law of trusts when resolving ERISA disputes.88
Trust law allows extracontractual damage awards in some cases.8 9
Thus, lower courts should not rely on the Court's overreaching
dicta, but should look instead to Congress's intentions.
The majority's opinion also fails to distinguish between meth-
82 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3087.
83 Id. at 3091.
84 See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
85 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3093.
86 Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, makes an argument similar to the one
presented here. See id. at 3097-98.
87 See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
88 See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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ods of enforcement and available remedies. 90 In order to award ex-
tracontractual damages, however, a court need not alter ERISA's
enforcement scheme. Rather, it need only determine the proper
damages available under the existing scheme. Moreover, the
Court's reluctance to "fine-tune" ERISA may prompt lower courts
to construe ERISA narrowly, delaying Congress's intention that
courts develop federal common law to govern pension plans.9 1
The Court's dicta is significant for several reasons. First, it indi-
cates that a majority of the Court is not amenable to extracontrac-
tual and punitive damage awards under ERISA. Second, it
demonstrates that the damage issue remains very much alive.9 2
Third, the Court's construction of the Act applies not only to Rus-
sell's particular claim but also to most or all claims for extracontrac-
tual and punitive damages.
C. Potentially Available Relief
After Massachusetts Mutual, a plan or a participant suing on be-
half of a plan may still recover extracontractual and punitive dam-
ages under section 409.93 The viability of these forms of damages
will hinge upon a court's interpretation of the meaning of "such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropri-
ate."9 4 The Court did not reach this question because it held that
participants cannot personally obtain any relief under section 409. 95
Thus, Massachusetts Mutual does not preclude a cause of action to
recover extracontractual and punitive damages on behalf of a plan.
The Court also did not preclude recovery of extracontractual and
punitive damages for a participant who brings an action under ER-
ISA section 502(a)(3), 96 for the majority did not refer to this
subsection. 97
90 The Court stated that it was "reluctant" to "fine-tune" ERISA's detailed enforce-
ment scheme by awarding Russell extracontractual damages. Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at
3093.
91 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. Federal common law will never
emerge if courts are unnecessarily restrained in reaching beyond ERISA's literal
language.
92 Five justices subscribed to Justice Stevens's broad language; four Justices con-
curred to point out its error.
93 See Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3092 n. 12 ("In light of this holding, we do not reach
any question concerning the extent to which § 409 may authorize recovery of extracon-
tractual compensatory or punitive damages from a fiduciary by a plan.").
94 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 7.
95 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
96 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982). This subsection allows a participant to bring an
action to obtain "appropriate equitable relief ... to redress [fiduciary] violations." Id.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
97 The concurrence implied that § 502(a)(3) may support a damage claim like Rus-
sell's. Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3095 ("[Slince § 502(a)(3) already provides participants
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Finally, the Court's focus on an individual's relief under section
409 leaves lower courts without effective guidance when considering
the scope of damage relief for a plan or for a participant under an-
other ERISA section. Thus, the Massachusetts Mutual decision is of
limited use in considering future ERISA damage claims brought
under other sections of the statute.
IV
ExTRAcoNTRAcTtAL AND PUNrrTVE DAMAGES UNDER ERISA
The Court's narrow holding leaves unanswered the question of
whether courts can award extracontractual and punitive damages
under ERISA. The increasing importance and financial magnitude
of employee benefit plans98 assures that this issue will arise again.
This section explores the propriety of awarding extracontractual
and punitive damages under ERISA in such future cases by examin-
ing the Act's legislative history, trust law concepts, and the statutory
language itself. The Note concludes that ERISA, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, authorizes awards of extracontractual, but not punitive,
damages.
A. Legislative History and Trust Law Concepts
In enacting ERISA one of Congress's declared purposes was to
protect employees' interests in their benefit plans by "providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts." 99 Congress intended that the courts develop a federal
common law to govern ERISA disputes. 100 Thus, the remedies to
which Congress referred need not be explicitly set forth in the statu-
tory text. The courts must therefore have discretion in formulating
remedies for violations of the statute.
Courts should fashion remedies for ERISA violations with ref-
erence to the right to be vindicated. Congress enacted ERISA in
part to guarantee specific rights to benefit plan participants.' 10
These rights are meaningless without remedies to compensate for
... with 'other appropriate equitable relief.., to redress [ERISA] violations,' there is no
reason to construe § 409 expansively .... This does not resolve, of course, whether and
to what extent extra-contractual damages are available under § 502(a)(3).").
98 In 1975, 44.5 million employees participated in 340,000 plans. The total
amount of money invested in these plans was $543 billion. In 1983, 67 million employ-
ees participated in 775,000 plans having a total value of $900 billion. Experts estimate
that by 1995, three trillion dollars will be invested in benefit plans. Lilly, The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 35 LAB. LJ. 603, 604 (1984).
99 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
100 Senator Javits remarked, "It is ... intended that a body of Federal substantive
law will be developed by the courts to deal with the issues involving rights and obliga-
tions under private welfare and pension plans." 120 GONG. REC. 29,942 (1974).
101 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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their violation. As Blackstone wrote, "Remedies are an integral and
necessary part of any system of law, for the substantive rights are
impotent unless a means for asserting those rights exists."' 10 2 More-
over, the chosen remedy should further the substantive policy that
Congress hoped to implement with the Act.103
Courts are not without guidance as to how to fashion these
remedies. Congress explicitly directed the judiciary to look to trust
law in construing ERISA.10 4 Nonetheless, Congress did not pro-
pose a wholesale adoption of trust principles. Instead, it intended
that courts shape trust concepts to accommodate the purposes and
goals of ERISA. 10 5
The general goal of damage awards in trust law' 0 6 is to make
the victim whole. 10 7 Both kinds of compensatory damages-general
and extracontractual-serve this purpose. In order to make a plain-
tiff whole, trust law allows extracontractual compensatory damages
awards to a plaintiff,'08 indicating that under proper circumstances,
102 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 55-56 (J. Andrews 4th ed. 1855). ChiefJustice
Marshall enunciated the significance of the remedy-right relationship within the struc-
ture of our democratic system. "The government of the United States has been emphat-
ically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
103 "The remedy is merely the means of carrying into effect a substantive principle
or policy. Accordingly it is a first principle that the remedy should be selected and mea-
sured to match that policy." D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at 3.
104 Senator Williams stated that in requiring strict fiduciary standards Congress
aimed to make the common law of trusts applicable to ERISA. Thus, ERISA prohibits
exculpatory clauses, establishes uniform fiduciary standards, prevents transactions en-
dangering plan assets, and (most pertinent to this Note) provides effective remedies for
breach of trust. 120 CONG. REc. 29,932 (1974). See also H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4639, 4649 ("The
fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to ... fiduci-
aries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.").
105 The Senate report reads, "It is expected that courts will interpret the prudent
man rule and other fiduciary standards bearing in mind the special nature and purposes
of employee benefit plans intended to be effectuated by the Act." S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4838, 4865.
Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that courts should also shape remedies with these
interests in mind.
106 Although law and equity have been merged, equity principles traditionally gov-
ern trust law. See A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 197 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959). Therefore, a court must apply equitable remedies to
redress the harm that a trustee has caused by his breach of duty. Equity courts histori-
cally could award monetary damages to remedy a fiduciary's breach of duty. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
107 G. BOGERT, supra note 26, § 863, at 48 ("The sole object of allowing the benefici-
ary interest is to make him whole-to place him in the position he would have been in if
the trustee had performed his duty."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 & com-
ment a (1959) (beneficiary entitled to remedy "which will put him in the position in
which he would have been if the trustee had not committed the breach of trust").
108 For instance, trust damages frequently include an assessment of interest. See G.
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courts should award extracontractual damages under ERISA. 10 9
A claim for punitive damages is more tenuous under trust law.
The vast majority of courts have refused to award such damages. 1 0
Despite the merger of law and equity, courts generally hold that
they cannot award punitive damages when acting in their equitable
capacity. Such damages remain a creature of law courts."' Princi-
ples of equity require courts to redress a victim for his harm; puni-
tive damages go beyond that goal by providing a windfall to the
plaintiff and punishing the defendant. 112
Nonetheless, some courts have allowed punitive damages in eq-
uity." 3  The future of this trend, however, remains uncertain.
Those courts that have awarded punitive damages in trust cases typ-
BOGERT, supra note 26, § 863. Courts also allow other types of extracontractual relief. See
Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (noting that
equitable restitution includes possible award of backpay, reinstatement, restitution of
benefits, and any other relief that will make plaintiff whole).
109 Numerous courts have allowed compensatory damages under ERISA in the
sense that "compensatory" means any damages that will make the victim whole. See, e.g.,
UAW v. Federal Forge, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (damages for mental
distress allowed); Bobo v. 1950 Pension Plan, 548 F. Supp. 623, 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)
(damages for mental anguish allowed); Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743 (D.D.C.
1980) (relief for unnecessary administrative and legal expenses); Bittner v. Sadoff &
Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (holds that court may award any
relief to make plaintiff whole).
110 Many courts, when denying punitive awards, subscribe to a strict procedural ap-
proach-equity courts cannot award punitive damages. For an example of a court
adopting this approach, see e.g., Carter Equip. Co. v.John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 681
F.2d 386, 396 (5th Cir. 1982) ("fiduciary duties are creatures of equity .... and ...
punitive damages are not recoverable in a court of equity") (citations omitted).
A minority of courts do allow punitive damages. See, e.g., Goggin v. Moss, 221 F.
Supp. 905, 920 (N.D. Tex. 1962) ("In view of the Fraudulent [sic] and flagrant miscon-
duct of the defendant. . ., he is liable to the plaintiffs in exemplary damages...."), aft'd,
323 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1963). For an argument opposing punitive damages awards in
breach of trust cases, see Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries-Is
Rothko Right?, 77 MicH. L. REv. 95 (1978).
111 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) ("[Ihe relief sought here-ac-
tual and punitive damages-is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of
law."); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982)
("[c]ompensatory and punitive damages are legal not equitable remedies").
112 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; see also D. DOBBS, supra note 15, at
211 ("One reason [that punitive damages are not available in equity] given [by courts is]
that equity's power was limited to equitable relief; any money judgment given in equity
was given only so far as necessary to decide the case and give complete relief. This
excluded recovery of punitive damages, since the plaintiff could certainly get complete
relief without them.").
113 See, e.g., Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal. App. 2d 225, 194 P.2d 533 (1948) (punitive
damages against fiduciary for misuse of trust funds granted); Hedworth v. Chapman,
135 Ind. App. 129, 192 N.E.2d 649 (1963) (reformation claim awarded along with puni-
tive damages); I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Central Park S. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 329, 189 N.E.2d
812, 239 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1963) (injunction and punitive damages granted);Jones v. Mor-
rison, 458 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. App. 1970) (injunction ordering removal of encroach-
ment denied, but compensatory and punitive damages granted).
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ically have done so only in instances of extreme fiduciary disloy-
alty.1 4 Therefore, if a court ever awards punitive damages under
ERISA, it should do so only for the most egregious fiduciary
breaches. 115
In addition to equity's presumption against punitive damages,
ERISA's legislative history and statutory scheme militate against
awarding such damages. The Supreme Court has required a clear
congressional directive in a statute or its legislative history to award
punitive damages before it will grant this relief.116 Congress in-
tended that plan participants gain complete relief; however, punitive
damages surpass this goal. Furthermore, ERISA explicitly provides
criminal sanctions for some fiduciary violations. 1 7 These sanctions
provide ample deterrence, rendering punitive awards unneces-
sary. 118 Finally, courts disfavor punitive damages as a form of re-
lief.119  For all of these reasons, courts should award
extracontractual, but not punitive damages, under ERISA.
B. Another Look at the Statute
The broad language of ERISA's enforcement provisions sup-
ports awarding extracontractual damages. Section 502(a) (3) explic-
itly grants participants a cause of action for redress of fiduciary
violations. 120 If a participant establishes that a fiduciary violation
has occurred, the section requires that the court determine the
scope of "appropriate equitable relief to redress [the fiduciary] vio-
lations."' 121 This statutory language is compatible with the trust law
114 See, e.g., Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 407 N.Y.S.2d 954
(1977) (punitive surcharge assessed against fiduciaries found guilty of self-dealing).
115 Some courts have allowed claims for punitive damages under ERISA. See, e.g.,
Winterrowd v. David Freedman & Co., 724 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1984) ("wilful, wan-
ton, and malicious" refusal by employer to make promised contributions justified puni-
tive award); Jiminez v. Pioneer Diecasters, 549 F. Supp. 677 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (court
refused to dismiss case because of plaintiff's request for punitive damages).
116 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979)
(Court refused to award punitive damages against union "[a]bsent clear congressional
guidance"); Local 20 Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1964) (Court
refused to award punitive damages because such damages were in "conflict with the
congressional judgment, reflected both in the language of the federal statute and in its
legislative history") (discussing National Labor Relations Act § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187
(1982)) (footnotes omitted).
117 See 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1982).
118 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
119 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Despite...
attempted justifications, the doctrine of punitive damages has been vigorously criticized
throughout the Nation's history."); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290,
294 (5th Cir. 1970) (punitive damages "are not a favorite in law and are to be allowed
only with caution and within narrow limits").
120 See supra note 10. Thus, a court will not have to engage in a Cort v. Ash analysis,
see supra text accompanying note 55, to imply a cause of action on behalf of the plaintiff.
121 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
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damage principle that courts should make a wronged beneficiary
whole.1 22 Adopting this approach, a number of courts have
awarded ERISA plaintiffs extracontractual damages.' 23
Section 409(a) contains language very similar to section
502(a)(3); it subjects fiduciaries to any "equitable or remedial relief
as the court may deem appropriate."' 124 "Remedial relief" encom-
passes all types of compensatory damages. Thus, section 409(a)'s
language justifies an award of extracontractual damages to the plan.
V
A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING WHEN
EXTRACONTRACTUAL DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE
UNDER ERISA
Although extracontractual damages should be available under
ERISA, they are not appropriate in every case. Courts need a rea-
soned approach to decide what circumstances warrant such an
award. In deciding what remedies are available for the violation of a
participant's right under ERISA, a court should first define the
scope of the right by examining ERISA's purposes, legislative his-
tory, and statutory text. Next, a court should note the general trust
law principles used to vindicate similar rights. Finally, a court
should apply those trust remedies that vindicate the participant's
right and that further the special concerns that Congress expressed
in establishing federal control over employee benefit plans.
The facts of Massachusetts Mutual illustrate the bases for this pro-
posed framework. The specific analysis of Russell's case will pro-
ceed in the context of a motion for summary judgment, that of a
court considering the plaintiff's allegations in their most favorable
light. 125 Russell could claim that her fiduciaries incompetently ad-
ministered her benefit claim. Although aware of her past history of
psychosomatic illnesses, her fiduciaries required that she only un-
dergo an orthopedic examination and relied solely on the orthope-
dic surgeon's report in denying her claim. A more prudent trustee
would have decided that her past medical history warranted a psy-
chiatric as well as orthopedic evaluation. Thus, a prudent trustee
would have examined the results of both examinations in determin-
ing Russell's eligibility.
Given this analysis, a court would allow Russell's action to pro-
ceed to trial where the factfinder could determine if her fiduciaries'
action constituted incompetent or imprudent administration of her
122 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 109.
124 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982).
125 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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claim. Both sides would have to produce evidence concerning the
action that a reasonable and prudent fiduciary would take in consid-
ering a similar claim. Then, the factfinder could compare the ac-
tions of Russell's fiduciaries to this standard and determine if they
acted within it. If the factfinder found a violation, then the court
would determine the appropriate damages under the proposed
framework.
A. Defining the Scope of the Right to Competent Claims
Administration
1. The Substantive Policies in ERISA's Legislative History
A survey of ERISA's purposes reveals that a participant has a
broad right to careful claims administration. The overriding pur-
pose of ERISA is to protect employees' "interests" in their benefit
plans. 126 Protection of these "interests" or "rights" should be a
court's paramount concern when resolving an ERISA dispute. 127 A
number of courts have recognized this concern by liberally constru-
ing ERISA to fully protect participants' rights. 128
ERISA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended to establish broad participant rights. Congress noted that
pension plan fiduciaries generally had become corrupt. 129 Congress
hoped that ERISA would eliminate this abuse' 30 and create a sense
of financial security for plan participants. A Senate Report main-
tained that Congress hoped ERISA would "assure American work-
ers that they may look forward with anticipation to a retirement with
financial security."' 131 To reach this goal, Congress sought to regu-
late fiduciaries' maintenance of the trust corpus. 132 Congress also
126 Congress declared that the purpose of ERISA is "to protect interstate commerce
and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ... by
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of em-
ployee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982).
127 The first subchapter of ERISA, entitled "Protection of Employee Benefit
Rights," reflects this concern. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
128 See, e.g., Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1984) (ER-
ISA is remedial legislation that courts should construe liberally in favor of protecting
plan participants); In re M&M Transp. Co., 3 Bankr. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same).
129 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4890, 4892 ("Cases have been noted of extreme misuse of
pension funds.").
130 A Senate report expressed Congress's hope that ERISA would "restore credibil-
ity and faith in... private pension plans." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4849.
131 Id.
132 ERISA imposes guidelines for adequate funding. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082-1085
(1982) (detailing minimum funding standards, exceptions, and alternatives). The stat-
ute also provides guidelines for competent fiduciary actions in securing benefit funds
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sought to protect participants' financial security by imposing gen-
eral standards of fiduciary care in the maintenance and administra-
tion of ERISA plans. 133 These guidelines help to give participants
confidence that they will ultimately receive their benefits.
ERISA section 404134 imposes strict duties on plan fiduciaries;
these duties complement the broad participant right to financial se-
curity. Broadly stated, a fiduciary must act for the exclusive benefit
of plan participants in a manner becoming a similarly situated pru-
dent person. A participant has the right to expect that a fiduciary
will meet this standard of conduct. 135
Congress intended that fiduciary duties apply to claims admin-
istration as well as management of the trust corpus.' 3 6 Conse-
quently, if a fiduciary fails to fulfill one of his administrative duties,
thereby undermining a participant's rightful expectations, a court
should make the fiduciary compensate for his wrong.' 3 7 Otherwise,
the duty to refrain from such actions will become nonexistent, un-
dermining the individual's right to competent claims administration.
and administering the plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982) (fiduciary
responsibilities).
133 See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
134 Section 404 provides in part:
(a) Prudent man standard of care. (1) .... a fiduciary shall discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and -
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like char-
acter and with like aims[.]
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
135 Congress recognized the interplay between participants' interests and fiduciary
duties by including provisions for private suits for breaches of fiduciary duty, see 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)-(4)(1982), and the recovery of attorney's fees, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(1) (1982), so that financial constraints would not prevent participants from
bringing suit.
136 See 120 CONG. REc. 29,932 (1974) (ERISA imposes "strict fiduciary obligations
upon those who exercise management or control over the assets or administration of an
employee pension or welfare plan") (statement of Sen. Williams); H.R. REP. No. 1280,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 301 n.1 (conference report) (procedures for delegating fiduciary
duties include "allocation or delegation of duties with respect to payment of benefits"),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038, 5081 n.1.
137 A conference report stressed that § 502 entitles participants not only to "recover
benefits due under the plan" and "clarify rights to receive future benefits under the
plan" but also to obtain other "relief from breach of fiduciary responsibility." H.R. REP.
No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 326 (conference report), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5107. See also 120 CONG. REc. 29,933 (1974) (beneficiaries enti-
tled to recover benefits "as well as to obtain redress of fiduciary violations") (statement
of Sen. Williams).
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B. Trust Law Fiduciary Obligations in the Administration of
Claims
Because Congress granted the courts broad lawmaking author-
ity138 and looked to the common law of trusts13 9 as a guide for de-
veloping the substantive law, the next step in considering a
claimant's ERISA damages is to ascertain the approach that trust law
would dictate. Trust law recognizes a beneficiary's right to adequate
administration and disbursement of trust funds. 140 Proper adminis-
tration of the trust represents one of a fiduciary's most basic du-
ties. 14 1  Remedies for trust misadministration include
extracontractual damages, such as an award of attorney's fees to
beneficiaries who sue to prevent unlawful trust administration 142 or
an award of interest for a trustee's failure to pay trust property when
due. 143 Thus, trust law provides a basis for Russell's claim for ex-
tracontractual damages for fiduciary misadministration under
ERISA.
C. Trust Principles in the Context of ERISA: Appropriate
Remedies for Misadministration
The final step in determining the appropriate type of damages
for an injured ERISA participant is to apply trust law principles in
the context of ERISA. Recognizing that the right to competent
138 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. One commentator, recognizing
this congressional mandate, stated that "the broad sweep of powers traditionally ac-
corded to courts of equity is fully applicable under ERISA .... Consistent with that
standard it has been held from the very beginning under ERISA that the equity courts
have 'the power and the duty to afford [sic, enforce] that [sic, the] remedy which is most
advantageous to the participants and most conducive to effectuating the purposes of the
trust.'" Gallagher, Recent Developments in Concepts Relating to Fiduciary Liability, 16 FORUM
753, 763 (1981) (quoting Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 462 (10th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis
and errors by Gallagher).
139 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
140 G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 109 (5th ed. 1973); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 174, 182 (1959).
141 Justice Brennan remarked that competent claims administration is "blackletter"
trust law. Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3096 (Brennan, J., concurring).
142 See, e.g., Wolff v. Calla, 288 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (trustee's refusal to
distribute trust corpus to beneficiary unjustified; deemed reasonable to assess defendant
individually for plaintiff's counsel fees); In re Trimble's Estate, 392 Pa. 277, 140 A.2d
609 (1958) (beneficiaries granted attorney's fees for suit to prevent misadministration).
143 See, e.g., Fox v. Schaeffer, 131 Conn. 439, 41 A.2d 46 (1944) (where trustee will-
fully withheld payments to beneficiaries of trust fund, courts may charge trustees com-
pound interest); In re Koffend's Will, 218 Minn. 206, 15 N.W.2d 590 (1944) (where
trustee failed to pay over property to beneficiary, courts may award beneficiary interest
to make him whole); In re Grove's Estate, 12 Misc. 2d 727, 177 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct.
1958) (where trustee's failure to make prompt payment is good faith mistake, court has
discretion to set interest rate). Courts may award either simple or compound interest
depending upon which type will make the beneficiary whole. Riggs v. Loweree, 189 Md.
437, 445, 56 A.2d 152, 156-57 (1947); see also G. BOGERT, supra note 26, § 863.
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claims administration is broad, and that trust law has allowed ex-
tracontractual damages for breach of this right, Russell's claim for
such damages should receive serious consideration. 144 Russell's ex-
tracontractual damage claim included two parts: damages for her
husband's cashout of his retirement savings and damages for mental
distress. 145 Both types of extracontractual awards comport with ER-
ISA's policies.
Russell's right to competent claims administration was the
means for ensuring her financial security. 146 Her fiduciaries' im-
proper administration allegedly caused her such financial hardship
that her husband cashed out his retirement savings. If true, then
her fiduciaries undermined Congress's goal of providing partici-
pants with financial security; damages would properly compensate
her for her loss. 147
Congress also sought to provide ERISA plan participants with
confidence in their benefit plans. 148 Congress sought to eliminate a
participant's fear of not receiving benefits when eligible. Russell's
realization of this fear allegedly caused her mental distress. Thus,
the policy of the Act further supports a damage award for mental
distress.
In summary, a court should permit Russell, stating her claim
under ERISA section 502(a)(3), to maintain a cause of action for
extracontractual relief. Allowing extracontractual damages would
144 Some courts have stated that ERISA heightens traditional trust law fiduciary du-
ties. For instance, the Tenth Circuit noted that ERISA prohibits numerous specific
transactions and limits the acquisition and holding of employer securities and real prop-
erty by plans. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978). These restrictions
supplement the familiar requirements of undivided loyalty to beneficiaries, the prudent
man rule, and the rule requiring diversification of investments. See also Eaton v.
D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D.D.C. 1980) ("The legislative history is replete with
indications of congressional concern to assure adequate protection for the interests of
plan participants and beneficiaries beyond that available under conventional trust
law.").
In Massachusetts Mutual, petitioners argued that ERISA's comprehensive statutory
scheme precludes a finding that Congress intended to award punitive or extracontrac-
tual damages for misadministration of benefit claims. Brief for Petitioners at 21-24, 36-
39, Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985) (microfiche). This argument fails to recognize
that such remedies may be necessary to further the substantive portion of the act. It also
fails to acknowledge that such remedies are indeed implicit within the statutory scheme.
See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
145 Mass. Mut., 105 S. Ct. at 3088.
146 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
147 Such an award would comport with traditional notions of damage relief. For
instance, Professor Sedgwick writes: "In all cases . . . of civil injury and of breach of
contract the declared object of awarding damages is to give compensation for pecuniary
loss; that is, to put the plaintiff in the same position ... as he would have been if the
contract had been performed or the tort not committed." 1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATSE ON
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 30, at 25 (1891) (footnotes omitted).
148 See supra note 130.
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vindicate a claimant's broad right to competent claims administra-
tion. It would solidify the accompanying fiduciary duty. Further-
more, such a damage award would fulfill the Act's purpose of
legitimizing employee benefit plans.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's narrow holding in Massachusetts Mutual-
extracontractual and punitive damages are unavailable to a plan par-
ticipant who brings an action for personal relief under section 409
of ERISA-fails to provide a framework for evaluating damage
claims under other ERISA provisions. ERISA's substantive policies
indicate that federal courts should provide full relief to a plan par-
ticipant when a fiduciary violates the participant's substantive rights.
To adequately reflect the scope of a participant's rights as granted
by the Act, courts should award extracontractual damages. An
award of punitive damages, however, would reach beyond the goal
of redress and Congress's purposes in enacting ERISA.
Diane M. Sumoski
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